Copyright © 2007-2008 The FreeBSD Documentation Project
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This document is intended as a guide for the configuration of an LDAP server (principally an OpenLDAP server) for authentication on FreeBSD. This is useful for situations where many servers need the same user accounts, for example as a replacement for NIS.
This document is intended to give the reader enough of an understanding of LDAP to configure an LDAP server. This document will attempt to provide an explanation of net/nss_ldap and security/pam_ldap for use with client machines services for use with the LDAP server.
When finished, the reader should be able to configure and deploy a FreeBSD server that can host an LDAP directory, and to configure and deploy a FreeBSD server which can authenticate against an LDAP directory.
This article is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the security, robustness, or best practice considerations for configuring LDAP or the other services discussed herein. While the author takes care to do everything correctly, he does not address security issues beyond a general scope. This article should be considered to lay the theoretical groundwork only, and any actual implementation should be accompanied by careful requirement analysis.
LDAP stands for “Lightweight Directory Access Protocol” and is a subset of the X.500 Directory Access Protocol. Its most recent specifications are in RFC4510 and friends. Essentially it is a database that expects to be read from more often than it is written to.
The LDAP server OpenLDAP will be used in the examples in this document; while the principles here should be generally applicable to many different servers, most of the concrete administration is OpenLDAP-specific. There are several server versions in ports, for example net/openldap24-server. Client servers will need the corresponding net/openldap24-client libraries.
There are (basically) two areas of the LDAP service which need configuration. The first is setting up a server to receive connections properly, and the second is adding entries to the server's directory so that FreeBSD tools know how to interact with it.
This section is specific to OpenLDAP. If you are using another server, you will need to consult that server's documentation.
First, install OpenLDAP:
This installs the slapd
and
slurpd
binaries, along with the required
OpenLDAP libraries.
Next we must configure OpenLDAP.
You will want to require encryption in your connections to the LDAP server; otherwise your users' passwords will be transferred in plain text, which is considered insecure. The tools we will be using support two very similar kinds of encryption, SSL and TLS.
TLS stands for “Transportation Layer Security”. Services that employ TLS tend to connect on the same ports as the same services without TLS; thus an SMTP server which supports TLS will listen for connections on port 25, and an LDAP server will listen on 389.
SSL stands for “Secure Sockets Layer”, and services that implement SSL do not listen on the same ports as their non-SSL counterparts. Thus SMTPS listens on port 465 (not 45), HTTPS listens on 443, and LDAPS on 636.
The reason SSL uses a different port than TLS is because a
TLS connection begins as plain text, and switches to encrypted
traffic after the STARTTLS
directive. SSL
connections are encrypted from the beginning. Other than that
there are no substantial differences between the two.
We will adjust OpenLDAP to use TLS, as SSL is considered deprecated.
Once OpenLDAP is installed via
ports, the following configuration parameters in
/usr/local/etc/openldap/slapd.conf
will
enable TLS:
security ssf=128 TLSCertificateFile /path/to/your/cert.crt TLSCertificateKeyFile /path/to/your/cert.key TLSCACertificateFile /path/to/your/cacert.crt
Here, ssf=128
tells
OpenLDAP to require 128-bit
encryption for all connections, both search and update. This
parameter may be configured based on the security needs of your
site, but rarely you need to weaken it, as most LDAP client
libraries support strong encryption.
The cert.crt
,
cert.key
, and
cacert.crt
files are necessary for clients
to authenticate you as the valid LDAP
server. If you simply want a server that runs, you can create a
self-signed certificate with OpenSSL:
%
openssl genrsa -out cert.key 1024
Generating RSA private key, 1024 bit long modulus ....................++++++ ...++++++ e is 65537 (0x10001)%
openssl req -new -key cert.key -out cert.csr
At this point you should be prompted for some values. You
may enter whatever values you like; however, it is important the
“Common Name” value be the fully qualified domain
name of the OpenLDAP server.
In our case, and the examples here, the server is
server.example.org
.
Incorrectly setting this value will cause clients to fail when
making connections. This can the
cause of great frustration, so ensure that you follow these
steps closely.
Finally, the certificate signing request needs to be signed:
%
openssl x509 -req -in cert.csr -days 365 -signkey cert.key -out cert.crt
Signature ok subject=/C=AU/ST=Some-State/O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd Getting Private key
This will create a self-signed certificate that can be
used for the directives in slapd.conf
,
where cert.crt
and
cacert.crt
are the same file. If you are
going to use many OpenLDAP servers
(for replication via slurpd
) you will want to
see Appendix B, OpenSSL Certificates For LDAP to generate a CA key and use it to
sign individual server certificates.
Once this is done, put the following in
/etc/rc.conf
:
slapd_enable="YES"
Then run /usr/local/etc/rc.d/slapd
start
. This should start
OpenLDAP. Confirm that it is
listening on 389 with
%
sockstat -4 -p 389
ldap slapd 3261 7 tcp4 *:389 *:*
Install the net/openldap24-client port for the OpenLDAP libraries. The client machines will always have OpenLDAP libraries since that is all security/pam_ldap and net/nss_ldap support, at least for the moment.
The configuration file for the
OpenLDAP libraries is
/usr/local/etc/openldap/ldap.conf
. Edit
this file to contain the following values:
base dc=example,dc=org uri ldap://server.example.org/ ssl start_tls tls_cacert /path/to/your/cacert.crt
It is important that your clients have access to
cacert.crt
, otherwise they will not be
able to connect.
There are two files called
ldap.conf
. The first is this file, which
is for the OpenLDAP libraries and
defines how to talk to the server. The second is
/usr/local/etc/ldap.conf
, and is for
pam_ldap.
At this point you should be able to run
ldapsearch -Z
on the client machine;
-Z
means “use TLS”. If you
encounter an error, then something is configured wrong; most
likely it is your certificates. Use openssl(1)'s
s_client
and s_server
to
ensure you have them configured and signed properly.
Authentication against an LDAP directory is generally
accomplished by attempting to bind to the directory as the connecting user.
This is done by establishing a “simple”
bind on the directory with the user name supplied. If there is an
entry with the uid
equal to the user name and
that entry's userPassword
attribute matches the
password supplied, then the bind is successful.
The first thing we have to do is figure out is where in the directory our users will live.
The base entry for our database is
dc=example,dc=org
. The default location for
users that most clients seem to expect is something like
ou=people,base
, so
that is what will be used here. However keep in mind that this is
configurable.
So the ldif entry for the people
organizational unit will look like:
dn: ou=people,dc=example,dc=org objectClass: top objectClass: organizationalUnit ou: people
All users will be created as subentries of this organizational unit.
Some thought might be given to the object class your users
will belong to. Most tools by default will use
people
, which is fine if you simply want to
provide entries against which to authenticate. However, if you
are going to store user information in the LDAP database as well,
you will probably want to use inetOrgPerson
,
which has many useful attributes. In either case, the relevant
schemas need to be loaded in
slapd.conf
.
For this example we will use the person
object class. If you are using inetOrgPerson
,
the steps are basically identical, except that the
sn
attribute is required.
To add a user testuser
, the ldif would
be:
dn: uid=tuser,ou=people,dc=example,dc=org objectClass: person objectClass: posixAccount objectClass: shadowAccount objectClass: top uidNumber: 10000 gidNumber: 10000 homeDirectory: /home/tuser loginShell: /bin/csh uid: tuser cn: tuser
I start my LDAP users' UIDs at 10000 to avoid collisions with system accounts; you can configure whatever number you wish here, as long as it's less than 65536.
We also need group entries. They are as configurable as user entries, but we will use the defaults below:
dn: ou=groups,dc=example,dc=org objectClass: top objectClass: organizationalUnit ou: groups dn: cn=tuser,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=org objectClass: posixGroup objectClass: top gidNumber: 10000 cn: tuser
To enter these into your database, you can use
slapadd
or ldapadd
on a file containing these entries. Alternatively, you can use
sysutils/ldapvi.
The ldapsearch
utility on the client machine
should now return these entries. If it does, your database is
properly configured to be used as an LDAP authentication server.
The client should already have OpenLDAP libraries from Section 2.1.3, “Configuring the Client”, but if you are installing several client machines you will need to install net/openldap24-client on each of them.
FreeBSD requires two ports to be installed to authenticate against an LDAP server, security/pam_ldap and net/nss_ldap.
security/pam_ldap is
configured via /usr/local/etc/ldap.conf
.
This is a different file than the
OpenLDAP library functions'
configuration file,
/usr/local/etc/openldap/ldap.conf
; however,
it takes many of the same options; in fact it is a superset of
that file. For the rest of this section, references to
ldap.conf
will mean
/usr/local/etc/ldap.conf
.
Thus, we will want to copy all of our original
configuration parameters from
openldap/ldap.conf
to the new
ldap.conf
. Once this is done, we want to
tell security/pam_ldap what to
look for on the directory server.
We are identifying our users with the uid
attribute. To configure this (though it is the default), set the
pam_login_attribute
directive in
ldap.conf
:
With this set, security/pam_ldap will search the entire
LDAP directory under base
for the value
uid=username
. If it
finds one and only one entry, it will attempt to bind as that user
with the password it was given. If it binds correctly, then it
will allow access. Otherwise it will fail.
PAM, which stands for “Pluggable Authentication Modules”, is the method by which FreeBSD authenticates most of its sessions. To tell FreeBSD we wish to use an LDAP server, we will have to add a line to the appropriate PAM file.
Most of the time the appropriate PAM file is
/etc/pam.d/sshd
, if you want to use
SSH (remember to set the relevant
options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config
, otherwise
SSH will not use PAM).
To use PAM for authentication, add the line
auth sufficient /usr/local/lib/pam_ldap.so no_warn
Exactly where this line shows up in the file and which options appear in the fourth column determine the exact behavior of the authentication mechanism; see pam.d(5)
With this configuration you should be able to authenticate a user against an LDAP directory. PAM will perform a bind with your credentials, and if successful will tell SSH to allow access.
However it is not a good idea to allow every user in the directory into every client machine. With the current configuration, all that a user needs to log into a machine is an LDAP entry. Fortunately there are a few ways to restrict user access.
ldap.conf
supports a
pam_groupdn
directive; every account that
connects to this machine needs to be a member of the group
specified here. For example, if you have
pam_groupdn cn=servername,ou=accessgroups,dc=example,dc=org
in ldap.conf
, then only members of
that group will be able to log in. There are a few things to
bear in mind, however.
Members of this group are specified in one or more
memberUid
attributes, and each attribute must
have the full distinguished name of the member. So
memberUid: someuser
will not work; it must
be:
memberUid: uid=someuser,ou=people,dc=example,dc=org
Additionally, this directive is not checked in PAM during
authentication, it is checked during account management, so you
will need a second line in your PAM files under
account
. This will require, in turn,
every user to be listed in the group, which
is not necessarily what we want. To avoid blocking users that
are not in LDAP, you should enable the
ignore_unknown_user
attribute. Finally, you
should set the ignore_authinfo_unavail
option
so that you are not locked out of every computer when the LDAP
server is unavailable.
Your pam.d/sshd
might then end up
looking like this:
pam.d/sshd
auth required pam_nologin.so no_warn auth sufficient pam_opie.so no_warn no_fake_prompts auth requisite pam_opieaccess.so no_warn allow_local auth sufficient /usr/local/lib/pam_ldap.so no_warn auth required pam_unix.so no_warn try_first_pass account required pam_login_access.so account required /usr/local/lib/pam_ldap.so no_warn ignore_authinfo_unavail ignore_unknown_user
Since we are adding these lines specifically to
pam.d/sshd
, this will only have an effect
on SSH sessions. LDAP users will
be unable to log in at the console. To change this behavior,
examine the other files in /etc/pam.d
and
modify them accordingly.
NSS is the service that maps
attributes to names. So, for example, if a file is owned by user
1001
, an application will query
NSS for the name of
1001
, and it might get bob
or ted
or whatever the user's name is.
Now that our user information is kept in LDAP, we need to tell NSS to look there when queried.
The net/nss_ldap port
does this. It uses the same configuration file as security/pam_ldap, and should not need
any extra parameters once it is installed. Instead, what is left
is simply to edit /etc/nsswitch.conf
to take
advantage of the directory. Simply replace the following
lines:
group: compat passwd: compat
with
group: files ldap passwd: files ldap
This will allow you to map usernames to UIDs and UIDs to usernames.
Congratulations! You should now have working LDAP authentication.
Unfortunately, as of the time this was written FreeBSD did not support changing user passwords with passwd(1). Because of this, most administrators are left to implement a solution themselves. I provide some examples here. Note that if you write your own password change script, there are some security issues you should be made aware of; see Section 4.3, “Password storage”
#!/bin/sh stty -echo read -p "Old Password: " oldp; echo read -p "New Password: " np1; echo read -p "Retype New Password: " np2; echo stty echo if [ "$np1" != "$np2" ]; then echo "Passwords do not match." exit 1 fi ldappasswd -D uid="$USER",ou=people,dc=example,dc=org \ -w "$oldp" \ -a "$oldp" \ -s "$np1"
This script does hardly any error checking, but more
important it is very cavalier about how it stores your
passwords. If you do anything like this, at least adjust
the security.bsd.see_other_uids
sysctl value:
#
sysctl security.bsd.see_other_uids=0
.
A more flexible (and probably more secure) approach can be used by writing a custom program, or even a web interface. The following is part of a Ruby library that can change LDAP passwords. It sees use both on the command line, and on the web.
require 'ldap' require 'base64' require 'digest' require 'password' # ruby-password ldap_server = "ldap.example.org" luser = "uid=#{ENV['USER']},ou=people,dc=example,dc=org" # get the new password, check it, and create a salted hash from it def get_password pwd1 = Password.get("New Password: ") pwd2 = Password.get("Retype New Password: ") raise if pwd1 != pwd2 pwd1.check # check password strength salt = rand.to_s.gsub(/0\./, '') pass = pwd1.to_s hash = "{SSHA}"+Base64.encode64(Digest::SHA1.digest("#{pass}#{salt}")+salt).chomp! return hash end oldp = Password.get("Old Password: ") newp = get_password # We'll just replace it. That we can bind proves that we either know # the old password or are an admin. replace = LDAP::Mod.new(LDAP::LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP::LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, "userPassword", [newp]) conn = LDAP::SSLConn.new(ldap_server, 389, true) conn.set_option(LDAP::LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3) conn.bind(luser, oldp) conn.modify(luser, [replace])
Although not guaranteed to be free of security holes (the
password is kept in memory, for example) this is cleaner and more
flexible than a simple sh
script.
Now that your machines (and possibly other services) are
authenticating against your LDAP server, this server needs to be
protected at least as well as
/etc/master.passwd
would be on a regular
server, and possibly even more so since a broken or cracked LDAP
server would break every client service.
Remember, this section is not exhaustive. You should continually review your configuration and procedures for improvements.
Several attributes in LDAP should be read-only. If left
writable by the user, for example, a user could change his
uidNumber
attribute to 0
and
get root
access!
To begin with, the userPassword
attribute
should not be world-readable. By default, anyone who can connect
to the LDAP server can read this attribute. To disable this, put
the following in slapd.conf
:
access to dn.subtree="ou=people,dc=example,dc=org" attrs=userPassword by self write by anonymous auth by * none access to * by self write by * read
This will disallow reading of the
userPassword
attribute, while still allowing
users to change their own passwords.
Additionally, you'll want to keep users from changing some
of their own attributes. By default, users can change any
attribute (except for those which the LDAP schemas themselves deny
changes), such as uidNumber
. To close this
hole, modify the above to
access to dn.subtree="ou=people,dc=example,dc=org" attrs=userPassword by self write by anonymous auth by * none access to attrs=homeDirectory,uidNumber,gidNumber by * read access to * by self write by * read
This will stop users from being able to masquerade as other users.
Often the root
or manager account for
the LDAP service will be defined in the configuration file.
OpenLDAP supports this, for example,
and it works, but it can lead to trouble if
slapd.conf
is compromised. It may be better
to use this only to bootstrap yourself into LDAP, and then define
a root
account there.
Even better is to define accounts that have limited
permissions, and omit a root
account entirely.
For example, users to can add or remove user accounts are added to
one group, but they cannot themselves change the membership of
this group. Such a security policy would help mitigate the effects
of a leaked password.
Say you want your IT department to be able to change home directories for users, but you don't want all of them to be able to add or remove users. The way to do this is to add a group for these admins:
dn: cn=homemanagement,dc=example,dc=org objectClass: top objectClass: posixGroup cn: homemanagement gidNumber: 121 # required for posixGroup memberUid: uid=tuser,ou=people,dc=example,dc=org memberUid: uid=user2,ou=people,dc=example,dc=org
And then change the permissions attributes in
slapd.conf
:
access to dn.subtree="ou=people,dc=example,dc=org" attr=homeDirectory by dn="cn=homemanagement,dc=example,dc=org" dnattr=memberUid write
Now tuser
and user2
can change other users' home directories.
In this example we've given a subset of administrative
power to certain users without giving them power in other
domains. The idea is that soon no single user account has the
power of a root
account, but every power
root had is had by at least one user. The root
account then becomes unnecessary and can be removed.
By default OpenLDAP will store
the value of the userPassword
attribute as it
stores any other data: in the clear. Most of the time it is base
64 encoded, which provides enough protection to keep an honest
administrator from knowing your password, but little else.
It is a good idea, then, to store passwords in a more secure format, such as SSHA (salted SHA). This is done by whatever program you use to change users' passwords.
There are a few other programs that might be useful, particularly if you have many users and do not want to configure everything manually.
security/pam_mkhomedir is a PAM module that always succeeds; its purpose is to create home directories for users which do not have them. If you have dozens of client servers and hundreds of users, it is much easier to use this and set up skeleton directories than to prepare every home directory.
sysutils/cpu is a
pw(8)-like utility that can be used to manage users in the LDAP
directory. You can call it directly, or wrap scripts around it. It
can handle both TLS (with the -x
flag) and
SSL (directly).
sysutils/ldapvi is a great
utility for editing LDAP values in an LDIF-like syntax. The
directory (or subsection of the directory) is presented in the
editor chosen by the EDITOR
environment variable.
This makes it easy to enable large-scale changes in the directory
without having to write a custom tool.
security/openssh-portable has the ability to contact an LDAP server to verify SSH keys. This is extremely nice if you have many servers and do not want to copy your public keys across all of them.
If you are hosting two or more LDAP servers, you will probably not want to use self-signed certificates, since each client will have to be configured to work with each certificate. While this is possible, it is not nearly as simple as creating your own certificate authority, and signing your servers' certificates with that.
The steps here are presented as they are with very little attempt at explaining what is going on—further explanation can be found in openssl(1) and its friends.
To create a certificate authority, we simply need a self-signed certificate and key. The steps for this again are
%
openssl genrsa -out root.key 1024
%
openssl req -new -key root.key -out root.csr
%
openssl x509 -req -days 1024 -in root.csr -signkey root.key -out root.crt
These will be your root CA key and certificate. You will probably want to encrypt the key and store it in a cool, dry place; anyone with access to it can masquerade as one of your LDAP servers.
Next, using the first two steps above create a key
ldap-server-one.key
and certificate signing
request ldap-server-one.csr
. Once you sign the
signing request with root.key
, you will be able
to use ldap-server-one.*
on your LDAP
servers.
Do not forget to use the fully qualified domain name for the “common name” attribute when generating the certificate signing request; otherwise clients will reject a connection with you, and it can be very tricky to diagnose.
To sign the key, use -CA
and
-CAkey
instead of
-signkey
:
%
openssl x509 -req -days 1024 \ -in ldap-server-one.csr -CA root.crt -CAkey root.key \ -out ldap-server-one.crt
The resulting file will be the certificate that you can use on your LDAP servers.
Finally, for clients to trust all your servers, distribute
root.crt
(the certificate,
not the key!) to each client, and specify it in the
TLSCACertificateFile
directive in
ldap.conf
.